The Private Value of Software Patents by Bronwyn H. Hall & Megan MacGarvie
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES









This is a revision of a paper written in April 2005. We thank Anne Layne-Farrar and LECG for the
use of the Corptech data, and we thank Jim Bessen for helpful suggestions and for supplying us with
the list of software patents used in Bessen and Hunt (2003). We are also grateful to two anonymous
referees and to Stu Graham, Bala Iyer, Michael Salinger, Lucia Silva, numerous participants in the
Empirical Patent Research Conference, St. Helena, California, February 2005, the IIOC, Atlanta, April
2005, the ZEW Conference on Patents and Innovation in Mannheim, September 2005, the Seventh
CEPR Conference on Applied Industrial Organization, Madeira, May 2006, the NBER Summer Institute
2006, the First Annual EPIP Conference, Munich, September 2006, and seminars at UCSD, University
of Kansas, University of Michigan, University of Maastricht, LMU-Muenchen, and RIETI, Tokyo
for extremely helpful comments. The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not
necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
© 2006 by Bronwyn H. Hall and Megan MacGarvie. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not
to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including
© notice, is given to the source.The Private Value of Software Patents
Bronwyn H. Hall and Megan MacGarvie
NBER Working Paper No. 12195
May 2006, Revised January 2010
JEL No. O34,L63,L86
ABSTRACT
We investigate the value creation or destruction associated with the introduction of software patents
in the United States in two ways. The first looks at the cumulative abnormal returns to Information
and Communication Technology (ICT) firms around the time of important court decisions that impacted
software patents, and the second analyzes the relationship between firms’ stock market value, the sector
in which they operate, and their holdings of software patents. We conclude that the market evaluated
software patents as a negative development ex ante. Ex post, a greater number of firms in all ICT sectors
invested in these patents, and these firms had slightly higher market values than those with no software
patents. However, while we obtain clear evidence that the technological importance or quality of patented
innovation mattered for the market value of hardware firms both before and after the legal changes,
it is less clear that the marginal patent right per se was associated with increases in market value, and
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The Private Value of Software Patents 




1.  Introduction 
Ever since software became generally patentable in the United States in 1995, the 
wisdom of such a change has been widely debated. Proponents of the change argue that there is 
no statutory reason to exclude software (or computer-implemented) inventions from 
patentability, and also that patenting software has social benefits from disclosure and from the 
fact that it enables software components to be reused by others (Cohen and Lemley 2001). 
Critics, who are numerous, base their arguments on a series of considerations: that such patents 
have often been of low quality, that they discourage rather than encourage innovation, and that 
they have a negative effect on the growing open source model of innovation (Kasdan 1994; 
Barton 2000, 2002; Hunt 2001; Bakels and Hugenholtz 2002; Lunney 2001; Dreyfuss 2000, 
2001; Meurer 2002). In a recent article in PC magazine, the columnist John Dvorak argued that 
software patenting is even bad for Microsoft, the largest patent holder among the pure software 
firms (Dvorak 2005). In Europe, patentability of software is still being debated, with no clear 
conclusion emerging (Blind et al. 2001; European Commission 2002; Spindler 2003). 
The economic view of the patent system sees this debate as an inevitable one, given the 
nature of patents: with a patent grant we trade off short term exclusive (monopoly) rights to the 
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use of an invention in return for two things: 1) an incentive to create the innovation; and 2) early 
publication of information about the innovation and its enablement. The argument is that without 
the patent system, fewer innovations would be produced, and those that were produced would be 
kept secret as much as possible to protect their returns from appropriation by others. In 
considering the economic impacts of a subject matter extension to software and business 
methods, the tradeoff between these benefits and the welfare cost of the grant of a monopoly 
right are at least as important as they are in any other technological arena.  
Recent analysis also says that although competition may suffer when we grant a 
monopoly right to an inventor, it will benefit if this right facilitates entry into the industry by new 
and innovative firms (Hall 2003)
3. Second, innovation will benefit from the incentive created by 
a patent but may suffer if patents discourage the combining and recombining of inventions to 
make new products and processes (Scotchmer 1991, 1996; Heller and Eisenberg 1998). There 
are several reasons to think that facilitating entry (the benefit of patents for competition) and 
discouraging recombination of elements (the cost of patents for innovation) may be particularly 
salient factors when considering the effects of patentability on the software industry. The 
software sector is characterized by low tangible assets and high intangible assets, which means 
that it is more important to have intellectual property rights in order to secure funding for 
investment. Software itself is typically cumulative and composed of a number of components 
which may come from a number of different sources, and where interoperability standards are 
                                                 
3 Cockburn and MacGarvie (2006) find evidence that firms holding patents are more likely to enter 
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important. Both factors mean that combination and recombination of inputs is an essential part of 
software creation.   
Evaluating the tradeoff between the benefits and costs of the introduction of software 
patents is a formidable, perhaps impossible, task. It is not made easier by the fact that the most 
important expansion of software patentability occurred in 1994-1995, exactly coincident with the 
internet revolution and the beginnings of its impact on the global economy’s use of software for 
a wide range of new applications.
4 To evaluate the impact of software patentability properly 
would require an examination of a counterfactual world without software patents and 
measurement of the differential impact on welfare and innovative activity in existing firms, new 
entrants, downstream buyers, and consumers. In this paper we look at one ingredient of the 
overall problem: the private returns to established computer hardware and software firms from 
the expansion of software patentability. If the patentability of software is beneficial for the 
economy, we expect that such firms will experience positive returns to its introduction, even if 
the overall economic effect is neutral or negative. That is, a finding that existing firms do not 
benefit financially from the introduction of software patents makes it probable that the impact on 
the economy as a whole is not positive either.   
Existing research on software patents reveals a dramatic increase in the propensity to 
patent software over the last two decades, and argues that this indicates that holding patents on 
software has become both easier and more valuable to firms (Bessen and Hunt 2003). In this 
paper we explore the relationship between firm value and the patenting of software in two 
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industry in Germany and Britain in the late 19
th century. However the rapidity with which attempts to patent 
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different ways. First we conduct a series of event studies that look at the immediate market 
impact of changes in the patentability of software on firms in sectors where software patenting is 
prevalent.
5 Second, we use the methodology of Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2005) to estimate 
the market value of software patents using various patent-related measures and we explore the 
effect of changes in the patentability of software over time on the market value of publicly traded 
firms that hold such patents.
6  
In performing these analyses, we separate the software firms in the sample into those that 
are “upstream” and those that are “downstream,” which corresponds to the position of their 
products in the computing stack, from the basic operating system layer to end user application 
software products (Raduchel 2006). We hypothesize that firms producing software that relies on 
hardware or software that is upstream from their software in order to operate may face more 
negative consequences than other firms from the introduction of software patents (at least 
initially), because they are more likely to need licenses for patented software technology in order 
to ensure that their products will operate successfully in a particular computer environment.  
The paper is organized in the following way: the next section reviews the recent history 
of software patenting in the United States. This is followed by a discussion of our data, which 
consists of a panel of publicly traded firms in the ICT sector; we also spend some time 
evaluating a number of definitions of “software” patents that are based on keyword searches and 
patent classification systems. The next two sections present our empirical results: first a series of 
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studies of the immediate stock market impact of software patentability decisions in the courts, 
and then the results for the relationship between firm market value and the ownership of patents. 
The latter results are presented for two subperiods, before and after the general acceptance of 
software patenting by the USPTO guidelines. The final section concludes. 
2.  Background 
The law concerning the patentability of software in the United States has evolved through 
a series of decisions following the passage of the 1952 Patent Act (which did not exclude any 
subject matter statutorily), to the point where algorithms may be patented if “there is practical 
application for the algorithm or if it is associated with a tangible medium (Sterne and Bugaisky 
2004, p. 221). Although a complete history of the use of intellectual property protection in the 
software industry is beyond the scope of this paper, we provide a brief summary here and refer 
the reader to Graham and Mowery (2003) for more detail.  
In 1972, the Supreme Court’s ruling in Gottschalk v. Benson held that because software is 
essentially a collection of algorithms, it could not be patented. In 1980, Congress confirmed that 
the appropriate intellectual property protection for software was copyright (Samuelson 1984).
7 
However, in 1981 the court allowed for patenting of software tied to physical or mechanical 
processes, such as the program implemented in the method for curing rubber at issue in Diamond 
v. Diehr, a decision which seems consistent with the present day European Patent Convention.
8 
                                                 
7 Patents and copyrights protect very different aspects of software. Copyrights are awarded to creators of 
“original works of authorship” and protect the specific computer code as an “original expression.” Copyright does 
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8 The European Patent Convention’s (EPC) treatment of patentable subject matter differs markedly from 
that of the United States Patent Act. Whereas in the US, the 1952 Patent Act opened the door to judicial expansions 
of patentable subject matter by not including any explicit limits on statutory subject matter, Article 52 of the EPC 
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However, this and subsequent decisions by the court during the next 15 years led the US Patent 
and Trademark Office (USPTO) to modify its position with respect to software patents, 
ultimately to one that allowed them even when not embodied in a physical process. As Figures 1 
and 2 show, the growth of software patenting increased from a 5-10 per cent level prior to 1981 
to a 15 per cent level afterwards, and then increased again in the mid-1990s, as the internet boom 
took off and the USPTO issued new guidelines for software patenting in response to a series of 
court rulings described later in the paper. 
Following the Diamond v. Diehr decision, the software patenting standard was 
substantially unchanged until the early 1990s when the rise of the personal computer industry 
and the consequent vertical disintegration of the computing sector encouraged software and 
information producers to test the subject matter exclusions with respect to software again. In 
1993 Compton Encyclopedia attempted to enforce a broad patent on the display of multi-media 
content on CD-ROMs against several firms; in response to complaints by these firms, the 
USPTO re-examined and revoked the patent in March 1994, which halted assertion of this 
particular software patent.  
But then later in 1994 an important change occurred when the Court of Appeals of the 
Federal Circuit (CAFC) stated (In re Alappat) that unpatentable software was that which 
represented “a disembodied mathematical concept…which in essence represents nothing more 
than a ‘law of nature,’ ‘natural phenomenon,’ or ‘abstract idea.’” Software that could be patented 
                                                                                                                                                       
methods for performing mental acts, playing games or doing business, and programs for computers “to the extent to 
which a European patent application or European patent relates to such subject-matter or activities as such” (EPO 
1989, emphasis added). In the case of software, the phrase “as such” has led to a number of software inventions 
actually being patented via their embodiment in hardware. See Bakels (2005) for a detailed discussion of the 
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was “rather a specific machine to produce a useful, concrete, and tangible result.”
9 A series of 
additional decisions, described in more detail in section 4 of this paper, culminated in 1995 with 
In re Beauregard, in which the CAFC ruled that the Patent Office’s rejection of a software patent 
application by IBM was erroneous. The Commissioner of Patents then issued new guidelines on 
the patenting of software, which allowed inventors to patent any software embodied in physical 
media (which essentially reversed the Gottschalk decision). (Sterne and Bugaisky 2004, p. 223) 
These decisions presumably lie behind the huge increases in software patenting during the 1996-
1999 period shown in Figures 1 and 2.  
A second important expansion of patentability took place in 1998 when Judge Rich 
issued the famous opinion in State Street Bank and Trust v Signature Financial Corporation.
10 
The Signature patent at issue was a “pure” number-crunching type of application, which 
implemented financial accounting functions. The Federal Circuit Court decision stated clearly 
that Section 101 (the section of the patent code that deals with subject matter for patentability) is 
unambiguous - “any” means ALL, and it is improper to read limitations into 101 not intended by 
Congress. Therefore, mathematical algorithms are non-statutory only when “disembodied” and 
thus lacking a useful application. The court went on to make sure that the decision was 
precedent-setting by stating that with regard to the business method exception, “We take this 
opportunity to lay this ill-conceived exception to rest.” 
This decision was followed by an increase in applications for “business method” patents, 
most of which are arguably also software patents, because they describe the implementation of a 
                                                 
9 In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1994), cited in Sterne and Bugaisky (2004), p. 222. 
10 State Street Bank and Trust Co., Inc. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
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business method on a computer or the internet. However, they are still a small fraction of all 
software patents (Hall 2003), at least when we use the relevant patent class (705) to define 
them.
11 Most of the analysis in this paper uses data that ends in 1999 or earlier, so these patents 
will play a relatively small role.  
2.1  The critique of software patentability 
Much of the critique of software patents centers on the perception that such patents are 
often of low quality, rather than the principle that software should never be patentable. The 
“quality” of a patent is a somewhat ill-defined catchall term for all the characteristics that the 
particular analyst would like patents to have. Hall (2003) and Hall et al (2003) review these 
criteria and argue why the failure of issued patents to satisfy them may be costly for firms and 
society. These criteria include satisfying the statutory definition of a patentable invention 
(novelty, non-obviousness, and utility),
12 sufficient disclosure to enable those “skilled in the art” 
to understand the invention, and relatively little uncertainty over the validity of the patent. A 
number of legal and technical scholars have critiqued the software patents issued after the series 
of court decisions in 1994-1995 on all of these grounds.  
First, because software development took place over a long period before software was 
patentable, when the USPTO began to handle large numbers of patents in this area in 1994-1995, 
they did not have examiners with the relevant training and lacked adequate data bases with 
software prior art. For example, on February 7, 1995, the following exchange between a patent 
                                                 
11 While the majority of business method patents are found in this class, it should be noted that they can be 
found in other classes as well, such as classes as 235, 380, 707, and 709. 
12 See Lunney (2001) for an argument that the non-obviousness test has been weakened since the creation 
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examiner and the editor concerning access to non-patent prior art took place in Aharonian’s 
Patent Newsletter:
13 
The examiner: “The problem with obviousness is evidence. When an 
examiner uses common sense, attorneys scream hindsight. Also, a problem with 
ordering non-patent publications or translations of foreign documents is the time 
it takes to process these requests. An examiner cannot simply call a company 
whose making, or is believed to have made, a product which appears to infringe 
on a claim. At best, the examiner could ask a librarian at our library to call a 
company to request info, but again that takes time. With ten hours to do a case, 
movement is paramount.” 
Aharonian: “Additionally for subjects like software, the cost of purchasing 
copies of technical papers would exceed the application fee, so I doubt many 
examiners would get the authority to spend such sums. Since for most software 
patent applications, the most relevant prior art is non-patent materials, between 
the statistics I cited on citing prior non-patent prior art (an average of two out of 
about 30) plus the above and below comments, one could make a good case that it 
is impossible for the PTO to conduct adequate novelty analyses.” 
The result of lack of access to adequate prior art was that many poor quality software patents 
were issued (Barton 2001; Kasdan 1994, 1999; Lunney 2001).  
Second, this sector is an extreme case of cumulative innovation, where one person’s 
invention depends on those of many other people and the transactions costs associated with 
licensing a large number of patents for any particular software product may exceed the profits 
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attainable from its creation and therefore discourage innovation altogether. Third, some claim 
that the disclosure function of patents is particularly badly served by software patents, which 
rarely include the source code implementation and are often quite vaguely and broadly worded. 
Even in the case of patents in general, both Cohen et al. (2002) (using US survey data) and 
Arundel et al. (2002) (using European survey data) report that firms rank a number of other 
means of acquiring information such as customers, exhibits, conferences, journals, suppliers, 
competitors, and nonprofit institutions ahead of patent disclosures as technical information 
sources. Furthermore, in contrast to other industries, it has been argued that patents on software 
do not generally serve to diffuse information about the patented technology. Mann (2004) states 
that:  
“It is clear that [disclosure] is an important benefit of patents in some industries, 
although the software industry in its current form is probably not one of them…As others 
have noted, with software cases the Federal Circuit has interpreted the disclosure 
requirement in such a way as to minimize the likelihood that disclosures will require 
information that is directly useful to competing inventors. Moreover, given the rapid pace 
of innovation, it will not often be the case that information disclosure in a patent 
application filed years earlier will be of immediate value to competitors in the industry.” 
14 
Finally, the growing open source movement has been extremely critical of such patents, 
because of the obvious fact that coexistence of open source with patented software is 
problematical. When independent invention is not a defense against infringement (as in the case 
of patents), a developer that issues a GPL or copyleft license to others on code that he has 
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developed cannot be sure that he has the right to do so. Thus the presence of patents on some 
innovations implemented via software may foreclose many avenues of open source development, 
unless low cost methods of licensing are developed.
15 
3.  Data 
To perform our study, we combine data on publicly traded firms and their market value 
for the 1975-2002 period with a version of the NBER patent and citations dataset that has been 
updated to 2002.
16 The patent data are matched to Compustat data on firms in the following SIC 
categories: 35 (machinery including computing equipment), 36 (electrical machinery), 38 
(instruments), 48 (telecommunications), and 73 (business services including software). This 
match was done using a version of Hall’s Compustat-assignee match updated to include firms 
that were not included in the previous (1995) version.
17 Using this updated match, we are able to 
identify patenting entities associated with 1,290 of the 2,379 Compustat firms in the SIC classes 
listed above. Our dataset is an unbalanced panel, and Appendix A3 lists the number of firms and 
the number of software firms in the dataset in each year of the sample. Both series have 
increased during the period, but software firms have clearly become more important as a share of 
the ICT sector.  
Table 2 contains summary statistics for the dataset. In order to identify the particular 
software area in which our firms operate, we have also incorporated information from the 
                                                 
15 For more on the debate on software patents and open source, see Evans and Layne-Farrar (2004). 
16 The update is available at http://emlab.berkeley.edu/users/bhhall 
17 Details on the matching algorithm can be found at 
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Corptech directory of technology companies on the type of software they produce (systems 
software, middleware, applications, or software-related services).
18 
3.1  Defining a software patent 
One difficulty that all researchers in this area encounter is that the definition of a software 
patent is rather unclear (Layne-Farrar 2005). Many scholars in the area may feel that ”we know 
one when we see one” but this is not a practical way to choose a particular set of patents out of 
the 3 million or so in our datasets. Although all patents are classified into a number of 
technology classes and simply choosing those patents that are associated with software classes 
might seem the desirable way to go, it is an unfortunate truth that many of the relevant classes 
are broad enough to contain both software and hardware patents, and some software patents end 
up classified in classes that do not appear to have anything to do with software at first glance.
19 
For this reason, different researchers have taken a number of approaches to identify software 
patents. In early versions of this paper, we explored the use of several different definitions and 
finally settled on a combination of them.
20  
The results reported in the body of the paper were obtained using a definition of a 
software patent that combined three ways of defining software patents. The three definitions are 
that used by Graham and Mowery (2003), that used by Bessen and Hunt (2003), and one that we 
                                                 
18 We gather this information from Corptech’s SOF product codes and the classification developed in Gao 
(2005), which is listed in the appendix to this paper. 
19 The four US patent classes with the largest number of patents assigned to our software firms are 382 
(Image Analysis), 345 (Selective Visual Display Systems), 341 (Coded Data Generation or Conversion), and 700 
(Data Processing: Generic Control Systems or Specific Applications), all of which can hold hardware as well as 
software applications. On the other hand, there are over 1000 such patents in 435 (Molecular Biology) and over 500 
in 84 (Music).  
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constructed based on the patent classes and subclasses that contain patents assigned to fifteen of 
the largest software firms (which we call Hall-MacGarvie). Our combined definition was the 
union of the set of patents in all relevant IPC and US patent classes (the union of Graham-
Mowery and Hall-MacGarvie) intersected with the set of patents found using a keyword search 
of title and abstract (Bessen-Hunt).  
As a check, we compare the results of these automated classification systems with the 
sample of software and internet business method patents identified manually by John Allison via 
a reading of the claims and description in the patents (Allison and Lemley 2000; Allison and 
Tiller 2003). In the remainder of this section of the paper, we describe the definitions more fully 
and present some comparative statistics based on them.  
Graham and Mowery (henceforth GM) identify as software patents those that fall in 
certain International Patent Classification (IPC) class/subclass/groups. Broadly defined, the 
class/subclasses are “Electric Digital Data Processing” (G06F), “Recognition of Data; 
Presentation of Data; Record Carriers; Handling Record Carriers” (G06K), and “Electric 
Communication Technique” (H04L).
21 Graham and Mowery selected these classes after 
examining the patents of the six largest producers of software in the U.S. (based on 1995 
revenues) between 1984 and 1995. Patents in these classes account for 57% of the patents 
assigned to the hundred largest firms in the software industry.
22  
Bessen and Hunt (henceforth BH) define software patents as those that include the word 
“software,” or the words “computer” and “program,” in the description and/or specification. 
Patents that meet these criteria and also contain the words “semiconductor,” “chip,” “circuit,” 
                                                 
21 The groups included are G06F: 3,5,7,9,11,12,13,15; G06K: 9,15; H04L: 9. 
22 Graham and Mowery, p. 232. The firms are Microsoft, Adobe, Novell, Autodesk, Intuit, and Symantec.  Hall and MacGarvie    December 2009 
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“circuitry” or “bus” in the title are excluded, as they are believed to refer to the technology used 
to execute software rather than the software itself.
23 Patents containing “antigen”, “antigenic”, or 
“chromatography” in the description/specification are also excluded.  
Our third algorithm for defining software patents (which we label HM) is similar to that 
used by Graham and Mowery. We identified all the U.S. patent class-subclass combinations in 
which fifteen software firms (Microsoft, Adobe, Novell, Autodesk, Symantec, Macromedia, 
Borland, Wall Data, Phoenix, Informix, Starfish, Oracle, Veritas, RSA Security, and Peoplesoft) 
patented and then categorized patents falling in these class-subclass combinations as “software.”
 
24 We refer to this definition of software patents as the Hall-MacGarvie definition. 
As a check of the accuracy of these various definitions, we used a sample of manually 
identified software and business method patents compiled by John Allison.
25 Using a sample of 
1000 patents issued between 1996 and 1998, Allison and Lemley (2000) identified 100 software 
patents by reading the claims and descriptions. Allison and Tiller (2003) augmented this sample 
with 230 internet business method patents, most of which are arguably members of the class of 
software patents. Table 1 shows the results of comparing this list with the patents selected by the 
three definitions, Bessen-Hunt, Graham-Mowery, and Hall-MacGarvie. From this procedure we 
can learn whether our samples include patents identified by Allison, although we are unable to 
ascertain how many patents in our sample would not have been labeled software by his 
                                                 
23 Bessen and Hunt, p. 4. 
24 One complication in using the U.S. patent classification system is that patents are continually reclassified 
as new classes are opened up. Software has been particularly subject to this reclassification, because there were no 
specific software classes until the “700” classes were created after the issuance of the USPTO guidelines in 1996. 
We are using the 2002 classification of all the patents in our dataset, which is late enough so that software should be 
correctly classified.  
25 We are grateful to James Bessen for making these patents available to us in machine-readable form, and 
for updating the data to 2002.  Hall and MacGarvie    December 2009 
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procedure. That is, we can measure Type I error (missing a software patent we should have 
identified) but not Type II error (calling a patent a software patent when it is not).  
The results are fairly clear: the keyword method of Bessen and Hunt is much more 
accurate in the sense of avoiding Type I error than either the International Patent Classification 
(IPC)-based classification or the US patent class-based classification, either of which identify 
only about half of these patents. Interestingly, Graham-Mowery is better at identifying software 
patents, whereas Hall-MacGarvie is much better at internet business method patents. This is 
probably because the US patent class system explicitly admits the existence of such patents, 
while the IPC does not, so they may end up classified in a wide range of IPC classes.  
Layne-Farrar (2005) describes an attempt to determine the Type II error in these different 
definitions of software patents. She reports that when software experts read a random sample of 
patents from each dataset to see if they were truly for software, they classified about 5 per cent of 
the patents held by packaged software firms in the Graham-Mowery and Allison-Tiller sets as 
not software.
26 Layne-Farrar finds that a larger proportion of the Bessen-Hunt sample were 
classified as not relating to software, which would suggest that using only this definition is 
problematic. However, since the latter sample (BH) includes patents held by firms across all 
industries, the results of the comparison between the three samples are somewhat difficult to 
interpret. 
However, because the GM definition does well on Type II error, and because GM and 
HM seem to select different groups of patents, whereas BH seems to be more comprehensive 
                                                 
26 Layne-Farrar did not have access to the sample selected by our US patent class rule, because her paper 
was written in 2005. It should also be noted that the Allison-Tiller sample consists of quite a specific set of internet-
related business method and software patents in classes 705, 707 and 709, and is not representative of software 
patents more generally. Hall and MacGarvie    December 2009 
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(better at Type I error), our preferred definition of software patents combines these definitions in 
the following way: we take the union of the GM and HM samples, and then intersect this with 
the BH sample. On the assumption that the HM US class/subclass approach does something 
similar to the GM IPC class/subclass approach, this intersects a sample that should have 
approximately 5% type II error (that is, it rarely misidentifies patents as software that are not 
software) with an inclusive sample that covers almost all software patents plus many other 
computing patents. The result is shown in the final row of Table 1: our new definition captures 
over 80 per cent of the patents identified by Allison as software and internet patents, but not at 
the cost of being too inclusive. We therefore chose to use this combined definition as our 
preferred sample of software patents, and to present results using the other definitions in an 
appendix. 
Figures 1 and 2 show the trends in software patent growth using the four definitions 
described above plus an aggregate software patenting series supplied by Aharonian (2001) in his 
email newsletter.
27 Figure 1 shows the absolute numbers and Figure 2 shows the share of 
software patents among all granted patents. The Aharonian definition appears to track that from 
the Bessen-Hunt keyword definition more closely than the others, whereas our combined 
definition is conservative and lies somewhere between the two patent class definitions (those 
using IPC and US patent classes). Using any of the definitions, there is substantial growth since 
1976 that accelerates in around 1995-1996. The apparent jump from 1997 to 1998 using any of 
the definitions results from a jump in applications three years earlier, that is presumably due to 
the series of court decisions that are described in the next section of the paper.  
                                                 
27 Greg Aharonian is a patent agent specializing in Information Technology sector patenting who has been 
tracking software patents using his own subjective evaluation of subject matter for some time. We include his 
figures to give some idea of the view of an observer familiar with the sector and its patenting.  Hall and MacGarvie    December 2009 
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4.  Event studies 
As discussed earlier, in 1994 and 1995, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
(CAFC) handed down a number of decisions that affected the scope of software patents. These 
decisions include In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (1994, en banc); In re Warmerdam, 33 F.3d 1354 
(1994); In re Lowry, 32 F.3d 1579 (1994), In re Trovato, 60 F.3d 805 (1995, en banc), and In re 
Beauregard, 53 F.3d 1583 (1995). In response to the confusion created by the court’s 
determination that much of software was patentable, the USPTO proposed new guidelines for 
software patentability on May 12, 1995, and published these guidelines on March 29, 1996. In 
this section of the paper, we describe the decisions and then present the results of several studies 
of the effects of the decisions on the value of firms in the software industry or holding software 
patents. Table 3 presents a timeline for the decisions we consider, with the abnormal returns 
experienced by our firms around the date of each decision (these results are discussed in section 
4.1) 
In re Alappat 
In 1988, Alappat filed an application for a patent on a means of smoothing the 
appearance of a waveform displayed by a digital oscilloscope. The PTO rejected the 
application’s claims as non-patentable subject matter. Alappat appealed the decision to the Board 
of Patent Appeals, which reversed the PTO’s decision on June 26, 1991. The patent examiner 
then requested a reconsideration of the decision by an expanded panel of the Board of Appeals, 
which on April 22, 1992 reversed the decision of the original panel. On July 29, 1994, the CAFC 
handed down a decision stating that the invention was not an “abstract idea”, but rather, “a Hall and MacGarvie    December 2009 
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specific machine to produce a useful, concrete, and tangible result.”
28 This decision was 
interpreted as a clear expansion of the patentability of software.
29  
In re Warmerdam 
The Alappat decision was followed on August 11, 1994 by In re Warmerdam, partly 
affirming and partly reversing the decisions of the Board of Patent Appeals, which had upheld 
the PTO’s rejection of an invention as non-patentable subject matter. The CAFC ruled that the 
invention, a mechanism for generating data structures for collision avoidance systems, was 
“nothing more than the manipulation of basic mathematical constructs, the paradigmatic ‘abstract 
idea’”, and sustained the rejection of five of the patent’s six claims.
30 However, the court 
affirmed one claim, implying that a machine containing in memory the data structure created by 
the mechanism would indeed be patentable (Huttner and Strobert 1995). 
In re Lowry 
Warmerdam was followed on August 26, 1994 by In re Lowry, which reversed the PTO’s 
rejection of an application on the grounds that a data structure held in memory was unpatentable 
under the “printed matter” doctrine. The “printed matter” doctrine provides that "an article of 
manufacture which consists of printed matter on a substrate cannot be statutory if it differs from 
other substrates only by the informational content of the printed matter except where there is 
                                                 
28 In re Alappat 33 F.3d 1526, 31 USPQ2d 1545 
29 The decision was first mentioned in the Wall St. Journal on August 8, 1994. We also tried computing 
abnormal returns around this date, but the CARs were not statistically significant. 
30 In re Warmerdam, 3 F.3d 1354, 31 USPQ2d 1754 Hall and MacGarvie    December 2009 
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some functional interaction between the printed matter and the substrate."
31 In this instance, the 
PTO had held that Lowry had not shown that the data structures were functionally related to the 
memory in which they were stored, but the CAFC ruled that the printed matter doctrine did not 
hold when the information in question was processed by a machine rather than by the human 
mind. 
In re Trovato and In re Beauregard 
In In re Trovato (December 19, 1994), the CAFC upheld the PTO’s rejection of a 
software patent for containing non-statutory subject matter. The patent covered a new technique 
for calculating the most efficient path of an object between states in physical space. The court 
ruled that “[p]utting Trovato's claims in their most favorable light, the most they provide is a 
systemic way in which to compute a number representing the shortest path. A new way to 
calculate a number cannot be recognized as statutory subject matter.”
32 On May 12, 1995, the 
CAFC ruled in In re Beauregard that the PTO’s rejection of a patent’s claims under the printed 
matter doctrine was incorrect given the precedent set in In re Lowry. The patent office admitted 
its mistake in the case.
33  
New UPSTO Guidelines 
In response to the above decisions, the USPTO proposed new guidelines for software 
patentability on May 12, 1995, and published these guidelines on March 29, 1996. The 
guidelines expanded on Warmerdam’s finding with respect to data held in the memory of a 
                                                 
31 USPTO 1995. See also In re Gulack, 703 F.2d 1381, 217 USPQ 401.  
32 In re Trovato, 60 F.3d 805. 
33 The Computer Lawyer, Vol. 12, No. 5; Pg. 30, May 1995 Hall and MacGarvie    December 2009 
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machine, stating that the PTO would begin to allow claims related to software embedded in 
physical media. Claims should be considered processes unless they relate to some type of 
machine or physical apparatus. The guidelines clarified the definition of the following criteria to 
be used by examiners to distinguish between  
“a) a computer or other programmable apparatus controlled by software as a statutory 
‘machine’; 
b) a computer-readable memory used to direct a computer, such as a memory device, a 
compact disc or a floppy disk as a statutory ‘article of manufacture’; and 
c) a series of steps to be performed on or with the aid of a computer as a statutory 
‘process.’”
34 
The guidelines stated that inventions that were to be considered non-statutory included 
data compilations or structures independent of physical elements, encoded information 
representing creative or artistic expression, and processes that do "nothing more than manipulate 
abstract ideas or concepts.”
35 
4.1  Null hypotheses on the effects of the patentability decisions 
As stated previously, the expansion of the patentability of software may have had both 
positive and negative effects. Firms already holding patents at the time of the decision may be 
positively affected due to an increased ability to exclude competitors from a market or collect 
licensing revenues. We will thus compare the effects of patentability on patent holders and non-
patent holders as of the time of the event, with the expectation that the market reaction should be 
                                                 
34 USPTO guidelines quoted in Huttner and Strobert (1995). 
35 op. cit. Hall and MacGarvie    December 2009 
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larger for patent holders. Note that another set of firms that may benefit from software patents 
are start-ups for whom patents may help secure financing. Because we are focusing on the 
market value of publicly traded firms, we are unable to study this effect.
36  
We also consider the potential negative effects of the decisions. For all firms, the 
decisions may have increased costs by creating the need to engage in licensing negotiations and 
by increasing the potential for hold-up. We hypothesize that the latter effect is especially relevant 
for firms in “downstream” market segments, i.e., firms producing software that must interact 
with or operate on top of other software or platforms. We thus test whether the market reacted 
negatively for firms specializing in applications software and software-related services relative to 
firms producing for “upstream” segments (middleware, systems software, and hardware).
37 
4.2  Results of the event studies 
Table 3 contains the results of the event studies that identify the market’s response to 
each of the above-mentioned decisions, for the entire sample of firms and for software firms 
only. We calculate the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) associated with the events, and their 
standard errors, using the standard market model approach as described in Appendix B. To 
obtain the market model for each stock, we regress the stock returns for firms in our sample on 
the market return (using the CRSP value-weighted market index) using data from the period (-
90, -30) relative to each event.
38 We then estimate the excess returns for the period (-1,+3) 
                                                 
36 Cockburn and MacGarvie (2006) study the effects of patent “thickets” on entry in narrowly-defined 
software product areas. 
37 See the appendix for our classification of firms into these segments. 
38 Our study includes some events that are less than one month apart. We choose the 30 day lag for the 
window to minimize any contamination arising from overlapping events.  Hall and MacGarvie    December 2009 
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around the event by summing the forecasted residuals from the market model and computing 
their standard errors, taking account of any correlation that might be present.  
For each event we show the average CAR for all firms in our sample and for four 
subgroups of firms: 1) firms that only produce software (firms whose primary SIC code is 73XX 
and who do not also produce hardware), 2) firms that specialize in applications software or 
software-related services, as defined by the Corptech directory or by our investigation using web 
searches,
39 3) firms that had not applied for patents in the year prior to the event, and 4) firms 
that had not applied for software patents in the year prior to the event. We also performed rank 
tests of the difference in the CAR distribution between the each group and other firms using the 
methodology described in Appendix B.
40 We group the CARs in this way because we expect the 
effect of the decisions to differ depending on whether firms can expect to take advantage of the 
increased strength of software patents. We expect that firms holding software patents at the time 
of decisions that broaden patentable subject matter to include some types of software will be 
positively affected relative to firms without patents. We also expect that firms in “downstream” 
sectors – like applications software and software-related services – will be negatively affected 
relative to upstream firms in hardware and middleware or systems software, because they may be 
forced to license in patented technology in order to ensure that their products will function on top 
of middleware or the operating systems. 
                                                 
39 As of the date of our data (2002), Compustat classified IBM into software services. Because of the 
importance of this firm in software patenting in general and because for most of our time period IBM was primarily 
a hardware firm, we have reclassified it into computing machinery. However, throughout this paper, we found that 
estimates with and without including observations on IBM were substantially the same.  
40 We found no significant differences for software firms versus hardware firms or application/services 
firms versus the others, so the results of these tests are not shown in the table. Hall and MacGarvie    December 2009 
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The first event we consider is the Supreme Court’s decision in Diamond v. Diehr, 
Surprisingly, this decision has a positive overall return of almost one per cent in our sample, and 
is also positive for all of the subsamples, although the number of software firms in the sample is 
too small in 1981 to yield significant results. One possible interpretation is that this development, 
which was a rather narrow extension of patentability to software embodied in hardware, was 
viewed as positive for the majority of firms then in the sample, almost 90 per cent of whom were 
not pure software firms.  
The next two events were the assertion of the Compton patent and its subsequent 
revocation.
41 The assertion was announced on November 16, 1993 at Comdex.
42 Clearly the 
assertion was viewed as highly negative news for all ICT firms, and especially for software 
firms, although the difference is not significant. There was little significant reaction to the 
revocation of the patent, suggesting that the event was anticipated. What reaction there was is 
slightly negative.  
The In re Alappat decision is widely viewed as the groundbreaking one on software 
patentability and this is reflected in the abnormal returns at the time of the decision.
43 All firms 
experienced negative abnormal returns, statistically significant at the 5 per cent level using the 
                                                 
41 Unfortunately, it is not possible to measure the reaction of the patent owner value to this event. Compton 
Encyclopedia had been purchased by Encyclopedia Britannica, a privately-held firm, in 1961, so no market value 
data is available. The patent was owned by Compton’s NewMedia, which was owned by the Tribune Company at 
the time of its assertion.  
42 John Eckhouse, writing in the San Francisco Chronicle the day before, reported that the patent had been 
kept secret since it was issued in August, but that it would be publicly announced at Comdex the next day. He also 
reported that “Attorneys who have seen some of the supporting documents say the patent will startle the industry 
because of its unusual breadth.” 
43In  reference  to  In  re  Alappat,  Evans  and  Layne-Farrar  (2004)  state  that  “This  ruling  cemented  the 
statutory standing of software patents.” (p. 6). Mann (2004) says Alappat “cleared the way for software patents” 
Cohen and Lemley (2001) state that “In 1994, the en banc Federal Circuit decided In re Alappat, opening a new era 
in software patent protection”(p. 10). 
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rank test. The negative returns were primarily due to those firms that had not applied for 
software patents by 1993 (the year preceding). However, the magnitude of the effects is small, 
less than one half of a percent.  
After Alappat, the next three decisions, In re Warmerdam, In re Lowry, and In re Trovato 
had little impact. The first two followed closely on Alappat and all three took the form of 
clarifying, partially affirming, and partially reversing that decision. In re Warmerdam was 
viewed as having ambiguous implications, and was seen to counteract previous extensions of 
software patentability while simultaneously affirming the patentability of  a machine storing 
“data structures” in memory.
44 While this latter aspect of the decision is today viewed (with the 
benefit of hindsight) as a step towards patentability, contemporary press reports suggest it may 
have been primarily interpreted as a reversal. The headline in The Computer Lawyer in 
September 1994 was “Federal Circuit Holds Collision Avoidance System Unpatentable.”
45 In re 
Lowry, a clear expansion of patentability but one that essentially confirmed Warmerdam and In 
re Trovato had little impact.  
In re Beauregard was a test case submitted by IBM in the wake of the Lowry decision, 
essentially looking for confirmation from the courts that the “printed matter” doctrine did not 
apply to software on physical media. In fact, the PTO conceded its mistake in rejecting the patent 
application in this case and the CAFC never rendered a decision. The result was PTO 
acknowledgement that a computer-readable medium qualifies as a statutory article of 
manufacture to the extent program code stored on the medium and executable by a processor 
                                                 
44 Hollander (2003), Paragraphs 18-22. 
45 See also Stobbs (1995), who contrasts Warmerdam with Lowry by writing “Warmerdam's data structure is 
not patentable subject matter… Lowry's data structure is patentable subject matter.” Hall and MacGarvie    December 2009 
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functionally defines the medium. The overall market reaction to this acknowledgement was 
significantly positive, but that for firms without patents and without software patents was 
significantly lower than for firms with patents.  
On the heels of the Beauregard decision, the USPTO announced a set of proposed new 
guidelines for software patents in May 1995. The announcement was viewed by the stock market 
as significantly negative for all firms in ICT, and especially so for software firms. However, the 
final issuance of the guidelines somewhat reversed this reaction, suggesting either the resolution 
of uncertainty or confirmation that the expansion of patentability would not be as broad as 
feared.  
5.  Market value and software patenting 
In this section of the paper we compare the financial market’s valuation of patents 
identified as software-related to its valuation of patents in general, both before and after the 
changes in software patentability rules in 1995. Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg 2005 (henceforth, 
HJT 2005) propose a methodology for estimating the contribution of patents and citations-
weighted patents to market value (Tobin’s Q). We use a variation of their methodology that is 
designed for the particular set of questions in which we are interested. In what follows, we first 
describe the econometric specification, and then turn to describing results for the overall sample 
followed by results for sub-samples of hardware and software, or applications/services and 
middleware/systems software firms. 
As noted in the HJT 2005 paper, economic theory is of limited help in determining the 
specification of an equation that relates market value to patents and citations, and the 
interpretation of the resulting coefficients can be difficult. There are two distinct problems: first, 
the market value relationship is a (moving) equilibrium relationship rather than a causal Hall and MacGarvie    December 2009 
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relationship and its coefficients measure the marginal shadow value of a particular asset at a 
particular point in time. Second, the asset for which patents are a proxy contributes to value in at 
least two ways: patents are both an indicator of the private value of innovative output and they 
are also intrinsically valuable, since they represent the right to exclude others from practicing the 
invention(s) which the innovation output incorporates. In the absence of patentability, the second 
source of value would not be present. However, the two sources are inextricably linked, because 
the private value of any particular innovation is inevitably related to the existence of the patent 
right. For this reason, it is not possible to construct or indeed even to imagine a pure ceteris 
paribus experiment using only market value data that would separate the two sources of value.
46  
What we do here is attempt to provide some indication of the ways in which the 
relationship between a firm’s patent holdings and its financial market valuation changed as a 
result of changes in the patentability of software. To do this, we make use of the fact that we 
have two patent measures: patent counts and a patent “quality” measure, the number of citations 
subsequently received by the patent.
47 By including both of these in our regression, we are able 
to make at least a partial distinction between the value of the patented inventions, and the value 
of the patent rights associated with them.  
However, the separation into these two value components is not perfect for at least two 
reasons. First, and related to the discussion above, we might expect that the pure value of a 
patent right is correlated with the value of the underlying innovation. Second, measurement error 
                                                 
46 The best way to measure the value of the patent right is probably to use patent renewal data, which 
measures the firm’s willingness to pay for the patent. However, such data is unable to say much about the value of 
the more valuable patents, given the low level of renewal fees, and most of the value of the portfolio is in patents 
renewed to full term. See Schankerman and Pakes () for an example of this methodology.  
47 Harhoff et al. (1999) provide evidence from a survey of inventors that forward citations are significantly 
positively correlated with the value of patents. Also see Nagaoka et al. (2010) for a recent survey of the use of patent 
data.  Hall and MacGarvie    December 2009 
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in any of these variables will contaminate the coefficients of all the variables that are correlated 
with that variable. In the case considered here, measurement error is inevitable, given that the 
variables are integer counts that merely proxy for the underlying concepts. For this reason our 
specifications will rely on variable constructions that are approximately orthogonal, in order to 
minimize the biases from measurement error and correlations.
48 The details of the specification 
are discussed in the next section after we present the basic estimation model.  
The HJT 2005 paper specifies a firm-level market-value equation that is linear and 
additively separable [following Griliches (1981)]. In that paper, the market value of firm i in year 
t was modeled as: 
( )
t
it t it it V q A K
σ γ = +   (1) 
where Ait stands for physical assets, and Kit the firm's knowledge assets. Some manipulation of 
this equation yields a nonlinear expression for the log of Tobin’s q as a function of the 
knowledge asset intensity.  
In this paper we chose to use a simpler first order logarithmic expansion of the log of 
market value for several reasons. The first was that our sample was very heterogeneous and skew 
in its patenting behavior, especially in its software patenting behavior, and we were anxious to 
mitigate the effects of outliers by using a robust functional form. The second was the presence of 
the software patenting variables and our desire to model them in a transparent way, one that 
made the results somewhat easier to interpret. Thus we started with the following simple 
equation for the market value of a firm: 
  log ( , ) it it it V f A K =   (2) 
                                                 
48 See Hall (2004) “A Note on Measurement Error and Proxy Biases” for more on these biases. Hall and MacGarvie    December 2009 
29 
Because the knowledge assets K are not observed directly, we model them as function of 
the R&D, patents, and citation-weighted patents: 
  , , , ,
it it
it it it it
it it
C SC





  (3) 
where Rit  is firm i’s R&D capital stock in year t, Cit is a measure of citation stock in year t, Pit is 
a measure of patent stock in year t, SPit is a measure of the software patent stock in year t, and 
SCit is a measure of the software citation stock in year t. 
The description of these variables is the following: 
R&D stock (R) – the stock of past R&D spending  
Citation stock/R&D stock (C/R) – a proxy for the success rate of the 
firm’s R&D program, this measures innovative output relative to innovative input. 
The citation stock is the discounted sum of citations received by granted patents 
that have been applied for in the current year and prior years. 
Software patent citation stock/R&D stock (SC/R) – a proxy for the 
quality or success of the firm’s software efforts. Adding this variable to an 
equation that also includes C/R allows software output quality to be measured as 
in increment to that of other innovations.  
Patent stock (P) – the stock of granted patents by application date 
Software patent stock (SP) – similarly for software patents only; note 
that these patents are also included in P. 
  
Substituting equation (3) into (2) and using a first order logarithmic expansion yields the 
following estimating equation:   
0 1 2
3 4 5
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  (4) 
In this equation, the coefficient γ2 measures the impact of (patented) innovation success 
controlling for the R&D that produces it and γ3 measures the premium or discount associated Hall and MacGarvie    December 2009 
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with patented software innovation success when compared with ordinary innovation. Assuming 
that C and SC control for the success and quality of innovation output, the coefficient γ4 
measures the additional value of having patents on this output, and γ5 measures the premium or 
discount assigned by the market to software patents. Note that success in innovation that is not 
associated with patents will not be captured by this model and remains in the residual; this is 
inevitable given our lack of measures of such success.  
  Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2005) provides evidence that citations to a firm’s own 
patents (self-cites) are about twice as valuable as other citations. This result suggests that self-
cites proxy for stronger appropriability of a particular technology as well as for the “quality” of 
that technology. That is, if a firm cites its own patents heavily, those patents have presumably 
been important in opening up a particular technological area to exploitation by that firm. In order 
to control for this possibility, we include the log of the ratio of self-cites to R&D in the 
regression as well.
49  
When estimating the model in equation (4), we included a complete set of year dummies 
for each of the 5 two-digit industries in our sample (machinery, electrical machinery, 
instruments, telecommunications, and software).
50 The R&D, citation, and patent stock measures 
are constructed using the usual declining balance method with a depreciation rate of 15 per cent: 
, 1 (1 ) δ − = − + it i t it K K R     (5) 
                                                
49 Because self-cites to all patents are highly correlated with self-cites to software patents in our sample, we 
did not include a separate variable for software patent self cites.  
50 We include the interaction between year and industry to deal with the large increase in valuation for 
software firms at the end of our sample period, which was presumably due to the dotcom “bubble”. Hall and MacGarvie    December 2009 
31 
where Rit is R&D spending, granted patents applied for in year t, or citations to granted patents 
applied for in year t.
51  
Our data include observations with no R&D, observations with no patents, observations 
with no software patents, observations with no self-citations, and various combinations of these. 
A simple way to deal with this problem without losing observations is to include a set of 
dummies for each of the various combinations; unfortunately several of the cells thus generated 
are either zero or very small, so that we need to drop some of them. In Appendix C, we present 
the distribution of missing or zero observations and explain how we chose a slightly reduced set 
of dummies for the analysis. The Appendix also presents a set of regression tables that are 
similar to Tables 4 and 5, but that include only these dummies. The six dummies we ended up 
using are the following (the left out category is nonzero R&D, patents, and software patents): 1) 
has R&D but no patents; 2) has patents but no R&D; 3) neither patents nor R&D; 4) has no self-
citations; 5) has R&D and patents, but no software patents; 6) has patents but no R&D and no 
software patents. The latter two dummies are only included in those regressions that also include 
the continuous software patent stock variables.  
5.1  Results for all sectors 
Equation (4) was estimated using ordinary least squares, and the results are reported in 
Table 4. Eicker-White standard errors clustered by firm were computed to ensure robustness to 
heteroskedasticity. There are three columns in each of the two panels in the table, one set 
                                                
51 Our patent data end in 2006 and our regressions in 2002. This means that we have four years to observe 
the issuance of the youngest patents in the sample, which is enough time to observe most of them. However, it is not 
sufficient time to observe forward citations for the most recent patents, so we have adjusted the number of citations 
received by each patent by the ratio of the total number expected to be received by a patent in that technology class 
to the average number such patents have received by the time of the relevant citation lag, using a methodology 
described in Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg  (2001). Hall and MacGarvie    December 2009 
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corresponding to the whole period, one set for the pre-guidelines period (1980-1994) and one for 
the post-1994 period (1995-2002), in order to focus on the question of whether financial markets 
placed a higher value on software inventions and software patents following the Beauregard 
decision and the Commissioner of Patents’ issuance of new guidelines on software patentability 
in 1995.  
The test for slope equality of the patent coefficients between the two periods rejects 
strongly for the specification without software patents, but not at all when we include the 
software patent variables. Thus the relationship between patenting and market value in the ICT 
sector appears to be stable across the two periods, provided we allow software patents to be 
valued differently (in fact, slightly more highly) from other patents. The coefficient on the log of 
firm assets is also significantly less negative in the second period than in the first, while the 
coefficient on the log of the ratio of R&D stock to assets increases slightly in both specifications.  
The impact of the citation-R&D ratio (a measure of innovation output relative to 
innovation input) is fairly stable across the two specifications, with a decline in the coefficient 
after 1995 (from around 0.08 to around 0.03 in both specifications). For firms that have patents, a 
one standard deviation increase in log cites per R&D increases market value by approximately 
12 per cent in the earlier period and 5 per cent in the later. Self-citations earn a substantial 
premium; however, it needs to be kept in mind that self-citations are only about 5 per cent of 
total citations on average, so that the net effect of increasing them is roughly the same as that 
given only by their own coefficient. Citations to software patents are valued the same as those to 
other patents, suggesting that the correlation between market value and invention quality is 
similar for software and ordinary patents.  Hall and MacGarvie    December 2009 
33 
Once citations (that is, the quality of patent output) are controlled for, the ratio of patent 
stocks to assets is negative and significant in the first period and insignificant in the second. This 
implies that, holding constant the quality of the innovation, filing additional patents hurt market 
value before the expansion of software patentability, and had no effect on value after the legal 
changes. Presumably, this is because some of the patents were filed with uncertain benefits prior 
to the legal change. In contrast, the ratio of the software patent stock to assets enters positively 
and significantly in the pooled sample and the second period, but is insignificant in the first 
period. For firms that have software patents, the net impact of a one standard deviation increase 
in the log of software patent stock per assets is approximately zero in the first period and 3 per 
cent in the second.
53 Thus, the negative effect of patents on market value (for a given level of 
invention quality) is mitigated if the patent is a software patent, and the value of both software 
and non-software patents rose after 1994, but neither the change in the software patent 
coefficient nor the coefficient itself are statistically significant.  
 Our F-test for differences in valuation between ordinary patents and software patents is a 
test of whether the coefficients of the software patent citation stock-R&D ratio and the software 
patent stock-assets ratio along with the two software patent dummies are nonzero. In the first 
period this test marginally rejects (significance level 0.09) and in the second period it rejects 
strongly. Although the number of firms with software patents and the number of software patents 
do increase between the two periods, the increase is not large enough to account for the change 
in significance via increased power of the test. It is more likely that the patents we have 
identified as software were to some extent different (and more valuable) after the legal changes 
                                                
53 The net effect of an increase in the log of software patents per asset is given by γ4 (SP/P)+γ5. The average 
share of software patents for firms that have them is 27% pre-1995 and 35% afterwards, which yields -0.10 0.27 + 
0.03 = 0 and -0.06 0.35 + 0.05 = 0.03.  Hall and MacGarvie    December 2009 
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in 1995. Note that the associated inventions do not appear to be more valuable, suggesting that 
there may have simply been slightly improved appropriability.  
Our conclusion from the results in Table 4 is that software patents were valued the same 
as other patents prior to 1995, but that after the change in patentability the market valued them 
somewhat more highly than other patents, even though the quality of the inventions themselves 
was not significantly different. In the next section of the paper we look at the way these findings 
differ across different ICT subsectors.  
5.2  Results for hardware and software 
In the top section of Table 5 we split the sample into software firms (5375 observations) 
and hardware firms (13,192 observations on machinery, electrical machinery, instruments, and 
telecommunications) and show the results for the same specification as in columns 4-6 of Table 
4, but only for the pre-1994 period and the 1995-2002 period separately. In this table we show 
only the R&D and patent coefficients for simplicity, although the regressions also include the 
assets variable and the industry-time dummies. The bottom of Table 5 presents results from the 
same regressions estimated separately for middleware/systems software (1092 observations) and 
applications software/software-related services/internet firms (4283 observations).   
These tables reveal some interesting detail obscured by the results based on aggregated 
data in Table 4. We note first that the valuation of patents does not change between periods for 
the hardware firms, while it changes significantly for the software firms, suggesting that the role 
of patents did indeed change for these firms after the Alappat and related court decisions. In 
addition, the premium for self-citations exists only for the hardware firms, and is insignificant for 
software. Perhaps software firms benefit as much from inventions by other firms that build on Hall and MacGarvie    December 2009 
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their inventions as from their own subsequent inventions. This is consistent with the idea that 
software firms depend more on recombinant invention involving other firms.  
However, in general the quality of inventions in software firms as proxied by 
citations/R&D is not significantly correlated with market value in either period, regardless of the 
type of citation. The software patent and citation elasticities have larger positive point estimates 
than for the hardware firms, but also have larger standard errors and are always insignificant. For 
software firms that patent the average share of patents that are software are 0.52 and 0.65 for the 
two periods, which implies that the net effect of the patent-assets ratio is about zero in the first 
period, and 0.06 in the second.  
In the lower portion of Table 5, we dig deeper by separating the software category into 
middleware/systems software (MS) and applications/software-related services (AS). We find 
some differences between these two groups of firms. First, the MS group generally holds more 
patents, even when we measure this relative to the size of their R&D program; 41 per cent of 
these firms patent at least once during the period, whereas only 31 per cent of the AS firms have 
a patent. Second, the negative value of holding patents relative to assets before 1995 was due 
only to the AS firms; for the MS firms, the elasticity of patents/assets is statistically 
indistinguishable from zero. Unfortunately, given the large standard errors (which are due to the 
relatively small sample size), we cannot really conclude that patents do not affect value for these 
firms, merely that we cannot detect an effect.  
For AS firms prior to 1994, the coefficients suggest a surprisingly large elasticity with 
respect to software citations per R&D dollar. A ten percent increase in the stock of citations to 
software patents/R&D is associated with a 3% increase in market value. So patents are correlated 
with value for AS firms in the early period, but only if they are “important” (highly cited) patents Hall and MacGarvie    December 2009 
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– and especially if they are important software patents. This positive premium for software 
citations disappears after 1994, which can be interpreted in two ways: either the marginal value 
of a successful software invention has declined, or invention quality is proxied better by R&D in 
the post-1994 period.  
It is perhaps worthwhile to note here that these estimates are based on the analysis of the 
correlation between a firm’s market value and its own patent stock, not factoring in the impact of 
changes in rivals’ patent holdings. Noel and Schankerman (2006) perform a similar market value 
analysis in which they also incorporate information on patent holdings by technological rivals,
58 
concluding that “a 10 percent increase in rivals’ patent propensity reduces a firm’s value by 1.3 
percent.” While our results are not directly comparable due to differences in specifications, it is 
interesting to compare this number with the elasticities described above, which generally find 
little benefit to firms of filing additional software patents. Noel and Schankerman’s estimate of 
the negative externalities of an across-the-board doubling of patent propensities would seem to 
exceed our relatively modest estimates of any positive effect on firm value of such a doubling.
59 
6.  Conclusions  
We obtain two sets of conclusions based on our two approaches to measuring the private 
value of software patents. First, we conclude that, as measured by the stock market’s reaction to 
legal decisions expanding the patentability of software, there is some evidence that the expansion 
                                                
58 This is the sum over all rivals’ patent stocks divided by R&D stocks, weighted by the rival’s 
technological proximity to the firm using a measure based on the Jaffe (1996) technological proximity measure and 
the pattern of backward citations of the firm. 
59 However, Noel and Schankerman also obtain much larger positive estimates for the value of the firm’s 
own patents, with the result that they estimate a small net positive impact on firm value of an across-the-board 
increase in patenting. Hall and MacGarvie    December 2009 
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of software patentability was initially negative for firms in the software industry. There is limited 
evidence of relatively negative effects on some types of software producers – applications 
producers and providers of software-related services, and firms with no patenting experience at 
the time of the decisions. The most important events from the perspective of news to the market 
are the original assertion of the Compton multimedia patent, which affected all types of firms 
negatively on average, and the announcement of proposed new guidelines for software patenting.  
Our second approach examines the relationship between Tobin’s Q and firms’ patent and 
citation stocks. We attempt to distinguish the quality of a patented invention from the patent right 
itself using information on patent citations and patent stocks normalized so as to minimize the 
correlation between these right-hand-side variables. We conclude that, while patenting 
“important” (high-cited) inventions is clearly positively correlated with market value overall, 
filing additional patents that do not increase the total stock of citations (i.e. increasing the patent 
stock holding constant invention quality), is negatively associated with market value. Following 
the expansion of software patentability in the mid-1990s, this negative relationship between 
patents and market value largely disappears for software firms (but not for hardware firms), but 
we cannot reject the hypothesis of no effect from filing additional software patents without 
increasing the total quality of patented inventions (i.e. the stock of patent citations). We do find, 
however, that firms without any software patents have lower market values on average than 
firms with software patents (all else equal). This suggests that while the marginal software patent 
filed may not be associated with much increase in market value, the decision of whether or not to 
patent at all seems to have been an important one. 
Combining these two sets of findings, we conclude that the market evaluated software 
patents as a negative development ex ante and expected that the expansion of software Hall and MacGarvie    December 2009 
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patentability would affect firms in downstream sectors and firms without patents relatively more 
negatively. Ex post, of course, a greater number of firms in all ICT sectors invested in these 
patents. While we obtain clear evidence that the technological importance or quality of patented 
innovations mattered for market value both before and after the legal changes, it is less clear that 
the patent rights per se were associated with increases in market value. 
This story paints a picture of firms adjusting to a new environment and set of rules, which 
were initially perceived by the market as negative for the software sector, and have resulted in 
uncertain benefits, despite the large increases in the number of patents filed and in the share of 
firms filing patents in this sector. Nevertheless we should also remind the reader that the majority 
of the software patents acquired during the past twenty years have been acquired by non-
software firms in the ICT sector (in our sample the figure is 54 per cent for software patents and 
75 per cent for all patents). In addition, two-thirds of the hardware firms have at least one patent 
during the sample period, while only one-third of the software firms have patented. These facts 
suggest that the growth in these patents has been driven to a great extent by the needs of 
hardware firms for large patent portfolios rather than by the needs of software firms to protect 
their inventions.  
 Hall and MacGarvie    December 2009 
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Appendix A 
Additional Tables and Figures 
Differences between software patent definitions 
We consider several different definitions of what constitutes a software patent (see p. 12-
17 for a discussion of these definitions). Figures 1 and 2 plot the total number of software patents 
granted and the number of software patents as a percentage of all patents granted, for each of the 
alternative definitions. 
Table A2 presents results from the market value model for the Bessen-Hunt, Graham-
Mowery, Hall-MacGarvie, and “combined” (GM or HM intersected with BH) definitions. Each 
column presents estimates for one of the definitions, and the differences between them highlight 
the importance of the choice of definition.. For software firms, looking at the entire sample 
period (1990-1999), software patents and forward citations are positively and significantly 
associated with Tobin’s Q across all the definitions.  The magnitudes of the elasticities are also 
comparable across definitions.  
However, there are differences between the definitions when we look at non-software 
firms and when we consider the change in valuation over time. Here, the BH definition diverges 
from the others, showing a positive and significant valuation of citation-weighted software 
patents for non-software firms, even in the pre-1994 period, as well as a decrease over time in 
the elasticity of market value with respect to software patents held by software firms. This may 
reflect the fact that the BH set of patents appears to contain a considerably greater number of 
hardware patents, at least according to the sample studied by Layne-Farrar.  Hall and MacGarvie    December 2009 
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Table A1 
Category Definitions Based on CorpTech product codes (SOF codes) 
Based on Gao (2005) 
 
SYSTEMS SOFTWARE: 




A.   Utility systems software 2 
B.  Communications systems software 
C.  Internet tools 
D.  Software development systems 
E.  Artificial intelligence software 
F.   Database/file management software 




A.  Accounting, banking, financial, government, military, legal, real estate, insurance, health 
services, public utilities, transportation, sales/marketing and distribution software 
B.  Technical/scientific software 
C.  Construction, facilities and communications management software 
D.  Manufacturing software systems 
E.  Media and communications software 
F.  Office automation software 
G.  Educational and training software 




A.  Software related services 













R&D/Assets 0.331 0.322 0.317 0.321 0.287 0.289 0.289 0.289
Patents/R&D 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.016 0.017 0.017
SW Pats/R&D 0.007 0.017 0.022 0.021 0.019 0.004 0.002 0.004
R&D/Assets 0.317 0.316 0.314 0.316 0.286 0.287 0.285 0.287
Citations/Patents 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.022 0.034 0.035 0.034
SW Cites/Patents 0.022 0.022 0.021 0.023 0.016 0.003 0.004 0.003
R&D/Assets 0.318 0.316 0.323 0.323 0.286 0.287 0.287 0.287
Citations/Patents (excluding self-cites) 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.008 0.022 0.034 0.036 0.032
SW cites/Patents (excluding self-cites) 0.022 0.022 0.011 0.006 0.016 0.003 0.002 0.005
R&D/Assets 0.365 0.348 0.335 0.350 0.260 0.265 0.266 0.265
Patents/R&D -0.023 -0.022 -0.019 -0.020 0.010 0.016 0.017 0.017
SW Pats/R&D 0.008 0.015 0.021 0.015 0.017 0.002 -0.001 0.001
R&D/Assets 0.356 0.352 0.338 0.351 0.260 0.262 0.262 0.262
Citations/Patents -0.017 -0.017 -0.008 -0.015 0.022 0.034 0.035 0.035
SW Cites/Patents 0.021 0.023 0.019 0.021 0.014 0.002 0.001 0.001
R&D/Assets 0.301 0.295 0.298 0.296 0.339 0.333 0.329 0.333
Patents/R&D 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.012 0.023 0.021 0.023
SW Pats/R&D 0.013 0.025 0.020 0.026 0.022 0.018 0.021 0.017
R&D/Assets 0.293 0.292 0.297 0.293 0.338 0.336 0.332 0.336
Citations/Patents 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.028 0.036 0.034 0.036
SW Cites/Patents 0.029 0.027 0.021 0.027 0.016 0.009 0.014 0.009
R&D/Assets 0.293 0.292 0.297 0.300 0.338 0.336 0.335 0.338
Citations/Patents (excluding self-cites) 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.010 0.029 0.037 0.038 0.037
SW cites/Patents (excluding self-cites) 0.029 0.026 0.021 0.011 0.016 0.009 0.009 0.006
Software firms
1980-1994 (924 software, 5989 non-software)
1995-1999 (1249 software, 2728 non-software)
Table A2
Elasticities from market value equations, by software/non-software and time period
1980-1999 (2173 software, 8717 non-software)
Hardware firms
All regressions include a complete set of sector-year dummies and a dummy for missing R&D.
The quantities shown are the average elasticity of the market value with respect to the variable in the first column. The significance tests are 
based on the corresponding coefficient and its heteroskedastic-consistent standard error.
Bold text indicates significance at the 5% level; Bold italics significance at the 1% level.Hall and MacGarvie    December 2009 
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Table A3: Total number of firms and number of software firms in the sample, by year 
 
 
Year All firmsSoftware firms App/Services All firms Software App/Services
1980 406 47 23
1981 511 76 41 184 25 17
1982 555 89 50
1983 664 121 71
1984 709 134 83
1985 722 141 88
1986 751 156 93
1987 758 155 96
1988 731 161 103
1989 719 159 99
1990 708 153 91
1991 730 163 95
1992 763 181 112
1993 833 201 118 625 152 93
1994 889 216 120 706 175 95
1995 1,003 262 145 749 194 104
1996 1,065 295 144 864 238 123
1997 1,029 292 144
1998 879 269 122
1999 999 382 164
Total obs 15,424 3,653 2,002
Market value regressions Event studiesHall and MacGarvie    December 2009 
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Appendix B 
Computing the CARs and Significance Tests 
There are at least two ways to compute the cumulative abnormal returns to holding a 
share of stock. The first is that of Salinger (1992), which simply estimates a stock market beta 
model for each firm that includes dummies for the event days and then combines the estimates 
across firms. The model is 
 
                    90,...., 30
             1,...,3
it i i mt it




α β λ ε
= + + = − −
= + + + = −
  (1) 
where rit is the rate of return to security i at day t, rmt is the market return, and the λs are the 
excess returns for the period (-1,+3) around the event. Because the event is common across 
firms, estimates from this set of equations using either seemingly unrelated regression on all 
firms or single equation estimation firm by firm will be identical. That is, there is no efficiency 
gain from joint estimation across firms because the right hand side variables are the same for 
each firm and no cross-equation constraints are imposed (Davidson and McKinnon 1993, p. 
313).  
Given estimates of the αs, βs, and λs, the CAR for firm i over the period (-1,3) can be 








CAR   (2) 
The standard error of this quantity (denoted si) must be estimated by taking account of the full 
covariance matrix of the estimated parameters for each firm, but this is straightforward using the 
delta method.
60   
                                                
60 This method is implemented by the ANALYZ command in TSP (Hall and Cummins 2005). Hall and MacGarvie    December 2009 
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Given estimates of the CARs and their standard errors, the best way to compute the mean 
CAR across firms is to compute a weighted average, where the weights are the square root of the 





















  (3) 
















  (4) 
In practice, it is easy to implement this computation of the average CAR and its standard error 
using weighted least squares with weights equal to the inverse of the previously computed 
standard errors squared.  
One problem with the Salinger approach is that if the event itself changes the risk of the 
security, a small amount of bias may be introduced by estimating the market model over the 
event period. An alternative that avoids this problem is to estimate the market model for a period 
prior to the event window and then compute the forecasted residuals for the event window period 
based on the estimates. In this case, assume we have estimates for αi and βi. The estimate of CAR 




ˆ ˆ ( ) α β
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= − − ∑ i it i i mt
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CAR r r   (5) 
 
                                                 
61 This method is optimal if the excess return due to the event is the same for all firms. See Campbell, Lo, 
and MacKinlay, p. 162, for further discussion.  Hall and MacGarvie    December 2009 
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Once again, the standard error of this estimate is straightforward to compute using the delta 
method, which takes account of the error in the estimated α and β. The mean CAR for any 
sample can be computed as described above.  
We used both methods to estimate the CARs and found that the results were qualitatively 
similar and for the most part also quantitatively similar. In the case of the non-parametric rank 
test described below, the results were identical, which suggests that the ranking of the firm’s 
returns was unaffacted by the choice of estimation method. In the text we report estimates and 
tests based on those computed using the pre-event market model method.   
Nonparametric significance tests 
We used the rank test method of Corrado (1989), which is also discussed in Campbell et 
al. (1997), Chapter 4. Using this testing approach is desirable in the case of stock market returns, 
which are frequently both non-normal and non-symmetric. It corresponds to asking whether the 
average of the within-firm ranks of the event period returns are approximately equal to the mean 
rank, as they would be under the null. The test is easily implemented using OLS regression once 
the ranks are available. First, we obtain estimates of excess returns for the entire period: 
  ˆ ˆ ˆ        90,..., 30; 1,..., 3 it it i i mt r r t λ α β = − − = − − − +   (6) 
The estimated α and β are based on the pre-event period (-90, -30). For each period t, the returns 
are ranked and assigned numbers from 1 to N (where N is the number of firms in the sample), 
yielding a set of series Rit that correspond to the λit. Under the null hypothesis of no abnormal 
returns, the expected value of the rank is a constant by construction, in this case equal to (66 
+1)/2 = 33.5.  
To obtain the test-statistic and its standard error given by Corrado (equations 8 and 9 of 
that paper), one simply regresses the ranks Rit on a constant and a dummy variable that is equal Hall and MacGarvie    December 2009 
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to one if t is in the event period, and zero otherwise.
62 It is straightfoward to show that the 
estimated coefficient of the dmmy and its standard error correspond precisely to the equations 
given in the Corrado paper. The advantage of the regression approach is that it is easy to 
implement further tests: for example, to test whether the shares of software firms responded 
differently than those of hardware firms to the event, we simply include the event dummy 
interacted with a dummy for being a software firm.  
 
   
                                                 
62 If desired, one can center the ranks before estimation by subtracting the mean and then there is no need 
for a constant. Centering the ranks would also be useful if each firm has slightly different numbers of observations 




In this appendix we describe the way in which we dealt with the fact that our data include 
many zeroes in the right hand side variables. Not all of our firms patent, and not all of our firms 
do R&D. In addition, there are many firms with no self-cites, or with no software patents. 
Because we use a log-log specification for our model, we had to include a set of dummy 
variables to control for observations that were zero for one or more of the R&D stock, patent 
citation stock, software patent citation stock, and self-citation stock.
63 A complete set of such 
dummies that included all possible interactions would number 16 = 2
4, but many of the cells 
would be very small, and some are zero by construction (for example, zero patent citations but 
non-zero software patent citations). After dropping these cells, the number of nonzero cells was 
8; we reduced this number to seven by treating the absence of self-citations separately (that is, by 
combining observations with and without R&D in that case). The left-out category was 
observations with both R&D and patents (whether or not these included software patents, so that 
we could test for their coefficients separately). The patterns of data presence and absence are 
shown in Table C.1.  
                                                 
63 The correlation between self-citations to all patents and self-citations to software patents was so high 
(0.88) that we dropped the latter variable and considered only self-citations to all patents.  Hall and MacGarvie    December 2009 
52 
 
 About half the sample both does R&D and patents, and almost 40% do R&D but do not 
patent. The remainder do no R&D but a small number of them (2%) patent. Software firms are 
much less likely to patent (25% vs. 59%) and also somewhat less likely to do R&D (77% vs. 
89%). Finally, over 90% of software firms have no self-citations, whereas only about half the 
hardware firms have no self-citations. However, adjusted for the fraction of firms that  patent, the 
software firms are slightly more likely to cite their own patents.
64 
Tables 4 and 5 in the body of the paper include a set of dummy variables for zeros in 
R&D and patenting as controls. When the continuous variables are also included in a regression, 
these dummy variables become difficult to interpret and we therefore did not show their 
estimates. However we thought it interesting to look at a regression that contained only the 
dummies, given the measurement error inherent in patent and citation counts. In this appendix 
we present the same regressions as in Tables 4 and 5 but with only the log of assets, the log of 
the R&D stock-assets variable and the R&D and patent dummy variables, along with the usual 
year-industry effects.  
                                                 
64 Compare 0.62 = 15.6%/25% for software to 0.58 = 40.8%/59% for hardware.  
Description Obs Share Obs Share Obs Share
R&D, patents, SW pats, and self-cites 2,989 16.1% 2,304 17.7% 685 12.4%
R&D, patents, SW pats, but no self-cites 763 4.1% 346 2.7% 417 7.6%
R&D, patents, no SW pats, self-cites 3,189 17.2% 3,013 23.1% 176 3.2%
R&D, patents, no SW pats, no self-cites 2,332 12.6% 2,063 15.8% 269 4.9%
R&D but no patents 7,287 39.2% 4,374 33.5% 2,913 52.8%
no R&D, but patents & SW pats, no self-cites 79 0.4% 20 0.2% 59 1.1%
no R&D, but patents, no SW pats or self-cites 302 1.6% 230 1.8% 72 1.3%
no R&D, no patents 1,626 8.8% 701 5.4% 925 16.8%
Total 18,567 13,051 5,516
Hardware Software
Table C.1Hall and MacGarvie    December 2009 
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In the first panel of Table C.2 we include dummies for doing R&D without patenting, 
patenting without doing R&D, doing neither, and having no self-cites to one’s patents. In the 
second panel we add the two dummies for having software patents, with and without R&D. 
These regressions are of some interest in themselves. First, we confirm the Hall-Jaffe-
Trajtenberg (2005) finding that citing one’s own patents indicates value: there is a fairly robust 
and significant 17-21% discount for firms with no self-citations, controlling for the fact that they 
have patents. Some of this discount may be due to the fact that we have no citation count in the 
regression, so that this variable also proxies for lower citation intensity, but the premium for self-
cites survives even in the presence of citations (Table 4 in the text).
65 The second finding in this 
table is that firms with no R&D stock face a discount of about 30%, whether or not they have 
patents. This discount corresponds to an R&D-assets ratio of approximately 0.2, which is 
roughly at the 15% point in the R&D-assets distribution.
66 That is, 15% of R&D-doing firms and 
25% of all firms have a lower R&D-assets value. The implication is that firms that do no R&D 
have a valuation that is similar to firms that do very little R&D relative to their size; that is, there 
is no separate discount for these firms.  
Note that doing R&D without patents earns a positive premium in the first period but not 
in the second, suggesting the increased important of patents as a tool for appropriating value. If 
some of those patents are software patents, the premium doubles, even for those few 
observations with patents but no R&D.   
                                                 
65 The alert reader will note that it is possible in principle for a firm to have patents but no citations. In fact, 
and partly because we use stocks, such observations are less than 1% of our sample and have an average patent stock 
less than one, so we chose to treat them as though the patent stock was zero, for simplicity.  
66 To compute the R&D intensity effect that corresponds to the dummy of -0.3, we set -0.3 = γ1 log(RD/A) 
= 0.2 log(RD/A) and solve for RD/A = exp(-1.5) = 0.22. 
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Table C.3 corresponds to Table 5 in the paper, and repeats the same dummy variable 
exercise for hardware and software firms separately and by subperiod. Although some of the 
estimates are imprecise due to the small size of some of the cells, a few conclusions can be 
drawn. We first note that the self-citation premium is associated only with hardware firms; for 
software firms the presence of self-citations does not appear to add any value. Although the 
dummies for no R&D with or without patents appear higher for software firms than for hardware 
firms, because the R&D intensity of software firms is also higher, the “break-even” point is 
again in the neighborhood of 10-15% in the R&D-assets distribution. Finally, the strongest result 
is that during the second (post-Alappat) period, a software firm with software patents was valued 
at a premium of 48% over similar firms without software patents, whereas holding software 
patents was of no additional value for hardware firms except for those few that have patents but 
no R&D. This finding confirms that financial markets perceived software patents to be valuable 
for software firms after 1995 but not before.  
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1980-2002 1980-2002 1980-1994 1995-2002 1980-2002 1980-1994 1995-2002
Observations (firms) N 18567 (2062) 10605 (1433) 7962 (1552) 18567 (2062) 10605 (1433) 7962 (1552)
Log R&D stock/assets 0.222*** 0.200*** 0.249*** 0.211*** 0.192*** 0.237***
(0.014) (0.016) (0.018) (0.014) (0.016) (0.019)
R&D but no patents 7,287 0.090** 0.141*** 0.015 0.133*** 0.168*** 0.070
(0.043) (0.048) (0.060) (0.043) (0.048) (0.060)
Patents but no R&D 381 -0.284*** -0.284** -0.265** -0.314*** -0.321*** -0.275**
(0.099) (0.118) (0.120) (0.093) (0.112) (0.116)
No R&D or patents 1,626 -0.349*** -0.278*** -0.421*** -0.300*** -0.246*** -0.360***
(0.060) (0.076) (0.076) (0.060) (0.077) (0.077)
Patents and R&D,with SW pats 3,752       0.179*** 0.143*** 0.182***
      (0.045) (0.052) (0.059)
Patents but no R&D,with SW pats 79 0.449* 0.566* 0.277
(0.260) (0.315) (0.283)
No self cites 12,389 -0.199*** -0.187*** -0.210*** -0.171*** -0.169*** -0.176***
(0.045) (0.051) (0.059) (0.046) (0.051) (0.061)
Log assets -0.073*** -0.100*** -0.040*** -0.084*** -0.110*** -0.051***
(0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.012)
F-test for equality of pat coeffs 
across periods
F-test for SW patent coefficients 9.2 (0.00)*** 5.2 (0.00)*** 5.0 (0.00)***
Standard error (R-squared) 0.857 (0.737) 0.793 (0.704) 0.928 (0.766) 0.855 (0.738) 0.791 (0.705) 0.926 (0.767)
Standard errors robust to heteroskedasicity in parentheses. Significance at the1%, 5%, and 10% levels indicated by ***, **, and *.
All regressions include a complete set of year dummies for each 2-digit sic (machinery, elec. machinery, instruments, telecomms, software), as well as dummies 
for no R&D, no patents, no software patents, no self-cites, and their interactions.
Table C.2
Market Valuation of Patents in ICT 
Dependent variable: log of Tobin's q
2.31 (.056)* 1.28 (0.262)
The method of estimation is least squares based on equation (4) of the text.Hall and MacGarvie    December 2009 
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N N N N
Log R&D stock/assets 0.170 0.018 *** 0.256 0.025 *** 0.246 0.035 *** 0.219 0.030 ***
R&D but no patents 2946 0.205 0.050 *** 1455 0.125 0.074 * 1585 -0.090 0.159 1328 0.125 0.110
Patents but no R&D 173 -0.187 0.103 * 99 -0.310 0.118 *** 66 -0.971 0.347 *** 65 0.161 0.216
No R&D or patents 407 -0.186 0.074 ** 298 -0.479 0.092 *** 434 -0.511 0.187 *** 491 -0.198 0.129
Patents and R&D,with SW pats 1392 0.133 0.052 ** 1318 0.069 0.071   347 0.045 0.199   756 0.478 0.110 ***
Patents but no R&D,with SW pats 9 0.220 0.423 11 0.721 0.364 ** 23 1.135 0.474 ** 36 -0.033 0.313
No self cites 5065 -0.199 0.051 *** 2736 -0.213 0.074 *** 2355 0.041 0.212 2300 -0.065 0.106
Std. error (R-squared)
F-test for equality of pat coeffs.
Observations (firms)
Log R&D stock/assets 0.337 0.095 *** 0.305 0.061 *** 0.224 0.037 *** 0.209 0.032 ***
R&D but no patents 354 -0.088 0.319 198 0.041 0.264   1212 -0.127 0.172 1122 0.149 0.119  
Patents but no R&D 19 -0.825 0.354 ** 4 -0.634 0.249 ** 32 -1.384 0.615 ** 54 0.285 0.220
No R&D or patents 97 -0.628 0.387 68 -0.115 0.329   333 -0.504 0.204 ** 423 -0.191 0.139
Patents and R&D,with SW pats 63 0.638 0.441 195 0.453 0.226 ** 257 -0.078 0.214   527 0.483 0.125 ***
Patents but no R&D,with SW pats 2 1.810 0.252 *** 1 2.205 0.128 *** 21 1.485 0.768 * 35 -0.219 0.315
No self cites 516 0.547 0.354 368 -0.192 0.223 1790 -0.061 0.235   1914 -0.057 0.121
Std. error (R-squared)
F-test for equality of pat coeffs.
Observations (firms)
Applications SW/Services Systems SW/ Middleware
Table C.3
Market Valuation of Patents and Software Patents
By sector and time period
1980-1994 1995-2002 1980-1994 1995-2002
0.736 (0.664) 0.895 (0.708) 0.936 (0.767) 0.966 (0.827)
Hardware Software
1.83 (.090) 2.73 (.012)**
8046 (1028) 5146 (930) 2559 (405) 2816 (622)
0.890 (0.819) 1.00 (0.836) 0.939 (0.757) 0.956 (0.827)
1.99 (.070)* 2.57 (.018)**
All regressions include a complete set of year dummies for each 2-digit sic (machinery, elec. machinery, instruments, telecomms, software), as well as dummies for no R&D, no 
patents, no software patents, no self-cites, and their interactions.
578 (103) 514 (146) 1981 (311) 2302 (508)
The method of estimation is ordinary least squares based on equation (4) of the text.
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Figure 3
Share of publicly-traded US firms with granted software patents








Number Share Number Share Number Share
Allison+ 100 100% 230 100% 330 100%
Bessen-Hunt (BH) 92 92% 211 92% 303 92%
Graham-Mowery (GM) 60 60% 89 39% 149 45%
Hall-Macgarvie (HM) 40 40% 150 65% 190 58%
Combined* 83 83% 183 80% 266 81%
+The original list is the set of patents given in Allison and Lemley (2000); the internet business method list is 
that from Allison and Tiller (2003).
*This set of patents is the union of GM and HM intersected with BH.
Table 1




method patent list Union of the two lists








Number of employees 4.17 22.63 0.36 0.12 1.28
Tobin's Q (market-to-book ratio) 6.96 11.94 3.10 1.75 6.95
Tobin's Q corr. for R&D stock 3.12 4.26 1.76 1.06 3.28
R&D stock (millions of $96) 182.10 1279.86 10.87 2.18 44.66
R&D Stock / tangible (book) capital 1.31 1.73 0.69 0.24 1.61
D(no R&D this year) 0.08 0.28 0.00 0.00 0.00
Patents per year 12.92 107.88 0.00 0.00 1.00
Patent stock 54.45 451.34 0.46 0.00 5.42
D(no patent stock this year) 0.47 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00
D(no software patent stock this year) 0.79 0.41 1.00 1.00 1.00
D(never patented) 0.37 0.48 0.00 0.00 1.00
SW patent stock (combined definition) 8.41 122.52 0.00 0.00 0.00
Patent stock / real R&D stock 0.35 1.96 0.00 0.00 0.25
Cite-weighted patents per year* 273.78 2347.61 0.00 0.00 18.44
Cite-weighted patent stock* 1230.08 10709.66 2.54 0.00 106.90
Cite-wtd SW patent stock (combined)* 257.99 3291.86 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cite-wtd patent stock / real R&D stock* 6.71 31.81 0.00 0.00 4.51
Cite-weighted patents per year** 227.13 1900.34 0.00 0.00 16.61
Cite-weighted patent stock** 1033.94 8777.80 2.45 0.00 100.45
Cite-wtd SW patent stock (combined)** 219.32 2622.03 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cite-wtd patent stock / real R&D stock** 6.07 29.03 0.00 0.00 4.20
R&D stock (millions of $96) 84.18 404.17 9.51 2.21 36.10
R&D Stock / tangible (book) capital 1.01 1.31 0.59 0.24 1.21
SW patent stock (combined definition) 1.77 17.55 0.00 0.00 0.00
Patent stock / real R&D stock 0.47 2.42 0.06 0.00 0.38
Cite-wtd SW patent stock (combined)* 61.62 652.72 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cite-wtd SW patent stock (combined)** 56.53 593.46 0.00 0.00 0.00
R&D stock (millions of $96) 335.16 1976.11 14.32 2.11 62.83
R&D Stock / tangible (book) capital 1.78 2.15 0.95 0.25 2.49
SW patent stock (combined definition) 18.80 194.47 0.00 0.00 0.53
Patent stock / real R&D stock 0.16 0.82 0.00 0.00 0.08
Cite-wtd SW patent stock (combined)* 564.94 5191.96 0.00 0.00 7.02
Cite-wtd SW patent stock (combined)** 473.79 4118.98 0.00 0.00 6.65
R&D stock (millions of $96) 313.46 1986.48 13.20 1.92 61.40
R&D Stock / tangible (book) capital 1.74 2.12 0.94 0.21 2.44
SW patent stock (combined definition) 19.35 212.73 0.00 0.00 0.27
Patent stock / real R&D stock 0.17 0.90 0.00 0.00 0.07
Cite-wtd SW patent stock (combined)* 577.24 5710.61 0.00 0.00 2.12
Cite-wtd SW patent stock (combined)** 477.61 4510.65 0.00 0.00 2.12
*Corrected for citation truncation after 2006
**Corrected for citation truncation after 2006 and self-citations excluded.
Table 2
Summary statistics for 2,062 firms 1980-2001 (18,567 observations)
Hardware firms only (11,323 obs)
Software firms only (7,244 obs)
Applications software and software services firms only (5,741 obs)Bronwyn H. Hall Page 6 1/7/2010
Event Date Description All firms
Software 
firms












Diamond v Diehr 3-Mar-81 patenting allowed for software embodied in rubber-
curing process (in a physical process) 0.83*** 1.26 1.40 1.40*** 0.97*** 0.91 1.40
Compton patent 16-Nov-93 assertion of multi-media display patent held by 
Compton -1.65*** -2.37*** -2.47*** -1.79*** -1.76*** -0.37 -0.54
Compton revocation 28-Mar-94 Compton's multi-media patent re-examined by 
USPTO and revoked -0.36 -0.41 -0.73 -0.30 -0.56 0.60 -0.54
In re Alappat 
(5440676)
29-Jul-94
33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc). Narrowing 
mathematical algorithm limitation on patentable 
subject matter and thereby expanding patentable 
subject matter. - oscilloscope software
-0.26** -0.02 0.25 -0.05** -0.32** 0.65 -1.46
In re Warmerdam 
(6089742)
11-Aug-94
partly affirmed, partly reversed PTO's rejection of a 
data structure for collision avoidance systems as non-
patentable subject matter - machine containing the 
data structure created by the mechanism patentable.  
0.08 0.34 0.32 0.05 -0.01 -0.86 -1.39
In re Lowry 26-Aug-94
data structures are patentable if held in a machine 
(printed matter doctrine does not apply) - confirming 
Warmerdam
0.16 -0.50 -0.69 0.36 0.23 1.35 0.86
In re Trovato 19-Dec-94
A new way to calculate a number cannot be 
recognized as statutory subject matter - countered 
growing trend of SW patentability
-0.12 0.25 0.19 -0.04 -0.05 0.33 1.09
In re Beauregard 
(5710578)
12-May-95
IBM appealed a decision to exclude using printed 
matter doctrine, PTO admits mistake (had 
contradicted in re Lowry)
0.76*** 0.90** -0.40 0.32 0.47*** -2.44*** -3.06***
USPTO new guidelines 
proposed
30-May-95
new guidelines proposed to allow patenting on 
software embodied in any hardware medium. -1.00*** -1.43*** -1.04** -0.85** -0.86*** 0.33 1.47
USPTO new guidelines 
final
29-Mar-96
new guidelines issued allow patenting on software 
embodied in any hardware medium. 0.36** -0.61 -0.32 0.35* 0.38* -0.56 0.01
Each cell in the first panel shows the average Cumulative Abnormal Return in per cent for a 5 day window (-1,+3) around the event date. 
The cells in the second panel show the result of a rank test for differences in the distribution of the CARs during the event period.
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent level respectively, using a rank test.
Table 3
Excess Returns [CAR(-1,+3)] to ICT Firms around Various Software Patenting Events
CAR (-1,+3) in % Rank test for differences in 
CARBronwyn H. Hall Page 7 1/7/2010
1980-2002 1980-1994 1995-2002 1980-2002 1980-1994 1995-2002
Observations (firms) 18567 (2062) 10605 (1433) 7962 (1552) 18567 (2062) 10605 (1433) 7962 (1552)
Log R&D stock/assets 0.250*** 0.238*** 0.269*** 0.238*** 0.230*** 0.256***
(0.015) (0.018) (0.020) (0.015) (0.018) (0.021)
Log Cite stock/R&D stock 0.049** 0.086*** 0.034 0.049** 0.082*** 0.029
(0.021) (0.024) (0.028) (0.022) (0.025) (0.030)
Log Self Cite stock/R&D stock 0.088*** 0.077*** 0.090*** 0.092*** 0.078*** 0.094***
(0.015) (0.017) (0.020) (0.015) (0.018) (0.020)
Log SW Cite stock/R&D stock -0.011 -0.004 0.003
(0.027) (0.037) (0.032)
Log Patent stock/assets -0.058*** -0.097*** -0.034 -0.079*** -0.102*** -0.058**
(0.017) (0.021) (0.023) (0.019) (0.023) (0.025)
Log SW patent stock/assets 0.059*** 0.030 0.050*
(0.022) (0.033) (0.028)
Log assets -0.075*** -0.102*** -0.043*** -0.084*** -0.109*** -0.053***
(0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012)
F-test for equality of pat coeffs 
across periods
F-test for SW patent coefficients 5.8 (0.00)*** 2.0 (0.09)* 3.6 (0.01)***
Standard error (R-squared) 0.850 (0.741) 0.786 (0.710) 0.921 (0.769) 0.847 (0.743) 0.784 (0.710) 0.918 (0.771)
Standard errors robust to heteroskedasicity in parentheses. Significance at the1%, 5%, and 10% levels indicated by ***, **, and *.
All regressions include a complete set of year dummies for each 2-digit sic (machinery, elec. machinery, instruments, telecomms, software), as well as 
dummies for no R&D, no patents, no software patents, no self-cites, and their interactions.
Table 4
Market Valuation of Patents in ICT
Dependent variable: log of Tobin's q
2.70 (.009)*** 1.30 (0.216)
The method of estimation is least squares based on equation (4) of the text.Bronwyn H. Hall Page 8 1/7/2010
Log R&D stock/assets 0.213 0.021 *** 0.296 0.027 *** 0.256 0.036 *** 0.220 0.032 ***
Log Cite stock/R&D stock 0.075 0.026 *** 0.053 0.034   0.095 0.084 -0.053 0.065
Log Self Cite stock/R&D stock 0.082 0.018 *** 0.104 0.022 *** -0.021 0.072 0.011 0.049
Log Patent stock/assets -0.083 0.024 *** -0.073 0.030 ** -0.146 0.062 ** -0.029 0.049  
Log SW Cite stock/R&D stock -0.029 0.032 0.003 0.039 0.186 0.130 0.078 0.059
Log SW patent stock/assets 0.028 0.032 0.025 0.032   0.052 0.102 0.080 0.053
Std. error (R-squared)
F-test for equality of pat coeffs.
Observations (firms)
Log R&D stock/assets 0.313 0.101 *** 0.338 0.064 *** 0.237 0.038 *** 0.206 0.034 ***
Log Cite stock/R&D stock -0.106 0.207 -0.025 0.150   0.113 0.083 -0.064 0.070  
Log Self Cite stock/R&D stock -0.064 0.136 0.122 0.091   0.046 0.078 -0.011 0.057
Log Patent stock/assets -0.075 0.180 -0.108 0.142   -0.204 0.077 *** -0.019 0.053  
Log SW Cite stock/R&D stock -0.150 0.222 0.101 0.138 0.279 0.132 ** 0.080 0.065
Log SW patent stock/assets 0.177 0.192 0.010 0.149 -0.012 0.099   0.088 0.058
Std. error (R-squared)
F-test for equality of pat coeffs.
Observations (firms)
Table 5
Market Valuation of Patents and Software Patents
By sector and time period
1980-1994 1995-2002 1980-1994 1995-2002
Hardware Software
0.728 (0.671) 0.883 (0.716) 0.929 (0.771) 0.962 (0.829)
1.40 (.166) 1.94 (.031)**
8046 (1028) 5146 (930) 2559 (405) 2816 (622)
1980-1994 1995-2002 1980-1994 1995-2002
Systems SW/ Middleware Applications SW/Services
0.888 (0.821) 0.999 (0.840) 0.926 (0.765) 0.952 (0.828)
2.17 (.018)** 3.58 (.000)***
All regressions include a complete set of year dummies for each 2-digit sic (machinery, elec. machinery, instruments, telecomms, software), as well as dummies for 
no R&D, no patents, no software patents, no self-cites, and their interactions.
578 (103) 514 (146) 1981 (311) 2302 (508)
The method of estimation is ordinary least squares based on equation (4) of the text.
Standard errors robust to heteroskedasicity in parentheses. Significance at the1%, 5%, and 10% levels indicated by ***, **, and *.